

CULTURE OF EXILE

Causes and consequences of Honduran migration (1980-2020)



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INTRODUCTION

In 1980, there were 39,000 Honduran immigrants in the United States, and by 2019, this figure had risen to 1.2 million¹. In other words, in almost 49 years this population grew 3,000%. In Spain, between 2016 and 2019, the Honduran community practically doubled, going from 50,000 to 96,000 immigrants².

Migration has become a flow of thousands of people coming into and going out of Honduras. It is estimated that every day around 300 people migrate³, while 256 are deported⁴. Currently, one out of every nine Honduran lives abroad, and more than 40% of the populations is thinking about or wishes to migrate⁵.

To respond to the increase of migration in the last forty years, the following questions are raised as a starting point: What happened in Honduras during these four decades? Why are these massive displacements taking place? How does this affect women? How has the State responded to face this phenomenon? What does it intend to do?

«**Culture of Exile: Causes and Consequences of Honduran Migration (1980-2020)**» interprets the evolution of the demographic movements in this Central American country, with a special emphasis on women who migrate.

Indubitably, migration reveals the political, economic and social situation of a country. To the question, «Why do people migrate?» Hondurans respond that they do not *leave*, they *flee* from two main factors: violence and inequality. In 2012, the country reached the highest homicide rate world-

Table 1: Honduran Population in USA (1960-2019)

Year	Population
1960	6.503
1970	19.118
1980	39.154
1990	108.923
2000	217.569
2010	633.401
2019	1,210.597

Source: USA Population Census. *FOSDEH's estimate for 2019.

wide⁶ and in 2018, it ranked as one of the three most unequal countries in the world⁷.

There are other scourges with equally alarming rates related to the poverty and insecurity indices, such as corruption, the weak economic growth, lack of stable labor opportunities, little access to justice, the gender gap, and environmental vulnerability.

Most of the population does not enjoy basic rights, such as, respect for life, access to adequate food and access to quality health and education systems. For that matter, 57% of Honduran migrants in the United States did not finish high school⁸.

¹ Hispanic or Latino Origin Population by Type. 2010. Census Brief. (Estimación de FOSDEH para 2019)

² *De Centroamérica no emigramos: huimos* (We do not migrate from Central America, we flee). El País. 2020. https://elpais.com/economia/2020/02/09/actualidad/1581272515_826011.html

³ *Cada día migran 300 hondureños rumbo a EEUU* (300 Hondurans migrate every day to the USA). La Prensa. 2018. <https://www.laprensa.hn/honduras/1153842-410/honduras-migrar-migrantes-eua-migraciones-indocumentados>

⁴ *Deportaciones de hondureños aumentan con las crisis migratorias* (Deportation of Hondurans increase with the migration crisis). El Heraldo. 2020. <https://www.elheraldo.hn/pais/1346747-466/gr%C3%A1ficos-deportaciones-de-hondure%C3%B1os-aumentan-con-las-crisis-migratorias>

⁵ *Sondeo revela que 4 de cada 10 hondureños desean o piensan emigrar del país* (Survey reveals that 4 out of every 10 Hondurans wish or think about migrating) Hondudiario. 2019. <https://hondudiario.com/2019/04/03/sondeo-revela-que-4-de-cada-10-hondurenos-desea-o-piensa-en-migrar-del-pais/>

⁶ *Honduras tiene la mayor tasa de homicidios del mundo, según la ONU* (According to the UN, Honduras has the highest homicide rate Worldwide) El Mundo. España. 2012. <https://www.elmundo.es/america/2012/09/27/noticias/1348764878.html>

⁷ *Sudáfrica, Haití y Honduras son los países más desiguales: Banco Mundial* (South Africa, Haiti and Honduras are the most unequal countries) Tiempo. 2018. <https://tiempo.hn/honduras-pais-mas-desiguales/>

⁸ Honduras: causalities of international migration. José Arnoldo Sermeño Lima. Honduras UNAH. 2018. <https://mdd.unah.edu.hn/assets/MDD/demomujer/volumenescompletos/DemoMujer-Vol.8.pdf>



Life



Education



Food



Health



Safety



Work

On the other hand, women and girls face specific challenges, such as discrimination, social exclusion, male violence, and lack of a response from a patriarchal and religious State that minimizes their demands. Therefore, migration is increasingly feminized until reaching 59% of the migration flow (9% more than the global rate)⁹, 52% of migrants in the USA¹⁰ and 70% in Spain¹¹.

As far as the national economy is concerned, migration is already the main source of foreign currency, outpacing other areas such as coffee production or the *maquilas* (assembly factories). In the last two decades, remittances increased by 850%, sending 5.4 billion dollars in 2019¹². However, this increase does not translate into a reduction in poverty, leaving, above all, enormous benefits to private banks and creating macroeconomic dependency. In view of this scenario, it is worth asking whether the State really intends to reduce migration.

Migration is evolving as the country and the region accumulate unsolved problems. The crisis of migrant children in 2014, or the caravans that captured the world's attention since 2018 do not change the governments' approach, who insists on addressing the phenomenon without holistic solutions. Thus, it is not surprising that 40 per cent

of those deported plan to attempt the crossing again¹³.

Every decade new factors appear and increase migration flows in Honduras, since the Central American wars in the 80's to the current climate change effects. However, what has never changed in the last forty years is this phenomenon, which put to the test the way of functioning of the main responsible: the State.

⁹ Investigation reveals that 59% of Honduran migrants are women. El País. Honduras. 2019. <http://www.elpais.hn/2019/09/23/investigacion-revela-que-el-59-de-hondurenos-migrantes-son-mujeres/>

¹⁰ FOSDEH estimate for 2019, based on data from the Hispanic or Latino Origin Population, Census Brief.

¹¹ Little Enoch or the curse of Honduras. El País. España. 2020. https://elpais.com/internacional/2020/01/25/america/1579970758_278449.html

¹² Honduras will receive a record number of remittances in 2019. Strategy and Business. <https://www.estrategiaynegocios.net/lasclavesdeldia/1339219-330/honduras-recibir%C3%A1-cifra-r%C3%A9cord-de-remesas-en-2019>

¹³ Characterization of Honduran migrant women deported from the United States. UNAN-MANAGUA National Autonomous University of Nicaragua Lorenzo Ubaldo Pavón Rodríguez. 2017. <http://cies.edu.ni/cedoc/digitaliza/t977/t977.pdf>

FOUR DECADES OF MIGRATION (1980–2020)

1970

Until the 80's the displacement of people between the different Central American countries had been permanent, but at a lower rate. On the other hand, massive migration to other countries are relatively recent, for example, in 1979 only 19,000 Honduran migrants lived in the USA¹⁴.

1980

However, since the armed conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua in 1980, the migratory flow in the region changed dramatically. As a result of these wars, Honduras received more than 230,000 refugees in its territory; even though it did not have the necessary conditions as a receiving country¹⁵.

1982

After several military mandates, the government of Roberto Suazo Córdoba (1982-1986) implied for Honduras the return to democratic order, generating hope among its citizens. However, in the context of the Cold War, the civil power maintained a military and corrupt nature, neglecting the social and strategic investment the country required to reduce its historical inequalities.

1990

Given the progressive deterioration of living conditions, in one decade, Honduras went from being a receiver of refugees to being a country that expelled emigrants. In 10 years, immigration in the United States increased 280%, from 39,000 migrants in 1980 to 109,000 in 1990.

REASONS TO MIGRATE

Migration, which started in the 80's, accelerated during the Rafael Leonardo Callejas administration (1990-1994), and reached its turning point with the implementation of the neoliberal model, characterized by the dismantling of social security through structural adjustment programs to the economy.

¹⁴ US Population Census. www.census.gov/population.

¹⁵ Report of the Troika on presentations to the FTAA Ministerial OMT Costa Rica 2012. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---americas/---ro-lima/---sro-san_jose/documents/publication/wcms_205970.pdf

Promoted by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the neoliberal model eliminated the National Planning System, devalued the currency, increased dependence on imports, dismantled what remained of the agrarian reform and produced government over-indebtedness, increasing poverty and the concentration of capital in a few hands.

At the Central American level, the peace agreements did not reverse the causes of the wars and inequality increased in the region, transforming thousands of refugees into migrants. According to historical data, the population born in Central America residing in the United States grew significantly, from 1.3% in 1980 to 5% in 1990¹⁶.

In Honduras, displacement continued to rise during the administration of Carlos Roberto Reina (1994-1998), who maintained – a more moderate - neoliberal model. Nonetheless, in 1998, migration suffered another breaking point, when Hurricane Mitch devastated much of the national territory, and affected the economy deeply. The natural disaster was accompanied by the inability of the Carlos Flores Facussé government (1998-2002) to face the consequences of the catastrophe, generating more poverty, unemployment and, as a consequence, an increase in displacements.

Because of its increase, migratory transit in the 90's became even more complex, due to the restrictions imposed by the receiving countries. This generated an increase in illegal migration and deportations, with around 332,000 people returning to Honduras from Mexico between 1990 and 2000. This scenario caused a redistribution of the migration flow. Clandestine networks devoted to smuggling people emerged¹⁷. It was during this period that the coyote figure appeared¹⁸.

The new century began with 217,000 Hondurans in the United States, 262% more than in the previous decade. The profile of migrants also changed. In 1998, 40% migrants came from rural areas, while in 2004, 61% they came from urban areas.¹⁹ In addition, other receiving destinations appeared, such as Canada, Spain and Italy, which had fewer immigration restrictions than the United States.

NEW CENTURY, MORE MIGRANTS

During the Ricardo Maduro Administration (2002-2006) migration flows continued to rise. The Maduro Administration promised to fight crime and gangs, which is a phenomenon imported from the Latino neighborhoods of the United States. However, this administration was effective in strengthening the business sector, but ineffective in reducing poverty and insecurity.

At the end of the Maduro administration and during the three years of Manuel Zelaya Rosales' term (2006-2009), the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) was promoted. The PRS was a millionaire program that aimed at reducing the causes of migration. However, its funds were used for clientelistic and welfare purposes, squandering another historic opportunity to reduce inequalities.

On the other hand, the 2009 Coup d'état had a negative impact on the country's socioeconomic and democratic conditions, generating a climate of political instability, international isolation and strong state repression. This breakdown of the constitutional order caused enormous economic losses, reducing remittances by 11% compared

¹⁶ Central America migration situation after the conflicts (América Central: situación migratoria después de los conflictos). Cecilia Olmos. México. 2005. <https://journals.openedition.org/alhim/366#ftn0>

¹⁷ Development, migration and security: The case of Honduran migration to the United States. Vladimir Recinos. Mexico. 2012. http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-75992013000200004

¹⁸ A "coyote" is a person that charges to smuggle illegal immigrants to the United States.

¹⁹ Report of the Troika on presentations to the FTAA Ministerial OMT Costa Rica 2012. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---americas/---ro-lima/---sro-san_jose/documents/publication/wcms_205970.pdf

to 2008, which generated a new wave of emigration²⁰.

In addition to the coup d'état, the first decade of the 21st century was characterized by the increase in organized crime, by a strong process of privatization of the public sectors and by economic dependence on remittances, to the point that in 2007 these accounted for 24,5% of the GDP of Honduras²¹.

The notable increase in crime between 2000 and 2019, resulting from the consolidation of drug trafficking and gangs, is a central element in explaining the growth of migration flows. Under this context, in 2010 there were 633,000 immigrants in the US, that is, 191% more than in 2000.

During the government of Porfirio Lobo Sosa (2010-2014) violence and poverty reached even more alarming levels. In 2012, the country had the highest homicide rate in the world, while in 2015 the poverty rate was the highest in the last 20 years nationwide, affecting 66.5% of households²². This precariousness of public security and the family economy increased internal mobilization, with 1.2 million displaced people between 2010 and 2015²³.

A number of migratory crises accompanies the political instability of the Juan Orlando Hernández Administration (2014-present). The first in 2014, when 18,000 minors from Honduras were detained at the US border²⁴, and the second, as of 2018 with the various massive caravans of emigrants, which have given a new voice and face to the phenomenon.

To respond to these caravans, the U.S. government signed a migration agreement in 2019 to make Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras "safe countries", with the aim of containing northward displacement by offering asylum in these three countries. However, Honduras does not have the minimum conditions to receive migrants, and paradoxically, what is increasing is the number of requests for asylum from its citizens abroad²⁵.

It is estimated that in 2019 there were 1.2 million Honduran immigrants in the United States, 91% more than in 2010. This figure is even more revealing if considered that according to official data of 2013, only 1% of the emigrants who tried to reach the US, achieved their goal²⁶.

CRISIS AFTER CRISIS

Migration is also an effect of the high levels of corruption in the country, calculated by the deviation of 254 billion lempiras between 2014 and 2019²⁷. These losses have a profound impact on the living conditions of the population. To mention a case, the looting suffered by the IHSS²⁸ between 2010 and 2014 of more than 300 million dollars, led to the death of 2,800 patients, due to the lack of a budget for their medical care²⁹. Faced with these situations, reasons such as access to a health system in other countries add to the reasons to migrate.

In the last 20 years, poverty barely decreased 1.8 points³⁰. In other words, the country is para-

²⁰ Economic Impact of the Coup d'état in Honduras. 2009. Mariana Ríos. Revista Pueblos. <http://www.revistapueblos.org/blog/2010/07/05/impacto-economico-del-golpe-de-estado-en-honduras/>

²¹ Honduras: causalities of international migration. José Arnoldo Sermeño Lima. Honduras. UNAH. 2018. <https://mdd.unah.edu.hn/assets/MDD/demomujer/volumenescompletos/DemoMujer-Vol.8.pdf>

²² Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). Multipurpose Permanent Survey of Households

²³ Honduras: causalities of international migration. José Arnoldo Sermeño Lima. Honduras. UNAH. 2018. <https://mdd.unah.edu.hn/assets/MDD/demomujer/volumenescompletos/DemoMujer-Vol.8.pdf>

²⁴ USA: Honduran migrant children crisis is higher than 2014. El Heraldo. 2019. <https://www.elheraldo.hn/minisitios/hondurenosenelmundo/1317728-471/eeuu-crisis-de-ni%C3%B1os-migrantes-hondure%C3%B1os-es-superior-a-2014>

²⁵ Increasing number of Honduran asylum seekers. HispanTV. 2018. <https://www.hispanTV.com/noticias/honduras/349618/aumenta-numero-hondurenos-solicitantes-refugio>

²⁶ Development, migration and security: The case of Honduran migration to the United State. Vladimir Recinos. México. 2012. http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-75992013000200004

²⁷ Estimation of the Macroeconomic Impact of Corruption in Honduras. Fosdeh. 2018. Honduras <http://www.fosdeh.com/2020/02/estimacion-del-impacto-macroeconomico-de-la-corrupcion-en-honduras/>

²⁸ IHSS: Honduran Institute of Social Security

²⁹ Flores, A. (2017, November 8). The balance left by corruption. Magazine. http://saqueoihss.com/enfermedad_muerte.html

³⁰ Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). Multipurpose Permanent Survey of Households

lyzed in social terms, affecting almost seven million Hondurans (between the poor and the middle class). Therefore, the 461 dollars a month that an average immigrant sends as a remittance³¹, promote people's decision to make the journey, despite the danger and the harsher deportation measures.

As far as the national economy is concerned, migration is already the main source of foreign exchange, surpassing other areas such as coffee production or the maquilas. In the last two decades, family remittances increased 850%, reaching a record figure of 5.4 billion dollars in 2019³². However, this increase does not translate into a reduction of poverty, leaving, above all, enormous benefits to private banks and a macroeconomic dependency. Against this backdrop, it is worth asking whether the state really intends to reduce migration.

The migratory phenomenon is also a consequence of citizen discontent towards the political class; 75% of the population considers that Honduras is governed for power groups and only 22% believes that it is governed for the good of the entire country³³. Only 21.4% think that the country is democratic³⁴ and only 34% affirm that they prefer democracy to another type of government³⁵.

In summary, crises in the past four decades have many fronts. Politically: a flimsy democracy. Socioeconomically: the precariousness of the population's living conditions. Of violence: with high rates of insecurity that affect the majority of citizens. Environmentally: with severe droughts that make Honduras one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change³⁶.

If the current context is considered, the decision to emigrate is understandable, where 65% of the population lives in poverty, with an average of 11 homicides per day and 3.4 million people

facing employment problems. As long as these indices persist, the migration flows will continue to increase.

³¹ Hondurans send an average of \$ 461 per month. El Heraldo. 2019. <https://www.elheraldo.hn/economia/1322239-466/hondure%C3%B1os-env%C3%ADan-un-promedio-de-46110-mensuales-en-remesas>

³² Honduras will receive a record number of remittances in 2019. Strategy and Business. 2019. <https://www.estrategiaynegocios.net/lasclavesdel-dia/1339219-330/honduras-recibir%C3%A1-cifra-r%C3%A9cord-de-remesas-en-2019>

³³ Latinobarometer. Report 2017. www.latinobarometro.org

³⁴ Latinobarometer. 2015, 2016 and 2017. <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latOnline.jsp>

³⁵ Latinobarometer. 2017. <http://www.latinobarometro.org>

³⁶ Honduras among the countries most vulnerable to climate change. The Press Honduras 2018. <https://www.laprensa.hn/honduras/1239208-410/honduras-vulnerabilidad-cambio-climatico-lluvias-sequia>

THE SITUATION OF WOMEN IN MIGRATION

Despite its invisibility, one of the most relevant trends in the region is the increase in female migration, recording a change in the forms and reasons for their displacement. Now women migrate independently - through dangerous routes that in the past were only used by men - as a result of three main factors: poverty, unemployment and violence.

In the case of Honduras, women currently represent 59% of the migratory flow (9% more than the global rate)³⁷ 52% of immigrants in the USA³⁸ and 70% in Spain³⁹.

Specifically, male violence against women and girls is one of the main reasons why women migrate. The crimes against women have consolidated a heartbreaking trend⁴⁰. Between 2005 and 2017, 5,348 women were murdered⁴¹, placing Honduras in 2013, with the highest rate of violent deaths of women in the world⁴².

Among the femicides, between 2012 and 2015, every 7.8 days a woman was killed by her partner or former partner, every 15 days a woman was raped and murdered, and every 2.2 days, organized crime killed a woman in Honduras. The data indicates that San Pedro Sula and the Central District concentrated 40% of these crimes⁴³, two urban centers that also have the highest migration rates.

Due to the lack of shelters in the country, thousands of women and girls embark in the mi-

gratory journey seeking greater security. Therefore, there is a direct relationship between the increase in male violence and the increase in female emigration. In the US alone, the Honduran female population grew 860% between 1990 and 2019, compared to 786% of men⁴⁴.

The country also registers a process of feminization in the heads of households. Currently, women, mostly single mothers, head 35% of households. However, these women face profound gender inequality that hinders them from moving the economy forward from their homes.

According to the World Economic Forum, which measures the gender gap in labor, political, educational and health access, Honduras ranks 68 out of 149 countries, with an index of 70.6%⁴⁵.

As for the labor market, the participation rate of women is 30% lower than that of men⁴⁶. Women also earn 30% less than men do. In the public, domestic and independent sector, for every lempira⁴⁷ a man receives, a woman earns around 70 cents. Only in the private sector is this trend reversed, women earn 20 cents more than men do.

This income inequality persists among the immigrant population, when observing that women who work in the US send \$ 224 less than men (\$354 vs. \$578). In other words, both national and international labor markets discriminate women⁴⁸.

The profile of Honduran women deported

³⁷ Research reveals that 59% of Honduran migrants are women. El País. Honduras 2019. <http://www.elpais.hn/2019/09/23/investigacion-reve-la-que-el-59-de-hondurenos-migrantes-son-mujeres/>

³⁸ FOSDEH estimate for 2019, based on data from the Hispanic or Latino Origin Population, Census Brief.

³⁹ Little Enoch or the curse of Honduras. El País. Spain. 2020. https://elpais.com/internacional/2020/01/25/america/1579970758_278449.html

⁴⁰ The risks of being a woman Oxfam. Ariel Torres Funes. Honduras 2018. <https://honduras.oxfam.org/riesgo-de-ser-mujer-honduras>

⁴¹ Bulletins of the National Observatory of Violence (ONV) 2005-2019

⁴² Honduras is the country with the most femicides in the world. Director: Telesur. 2014. <https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Honduras-es-el-pais-con-mas-femicidios-del-mundo-20140829-0046.html>

⁴³ Bulletins of the National Observatory of Violence (ONV) 2005-2019

⁴⁴ Hispanic or Latino Origin Population by Type. 2010. Census Brief. (FOSDEH estimate for 2019)

⁴⁵ Differences by gender increase in Honduras shall be required. 2018. <https://datosmacro.expansion.com/demografia/indice-brecha-genero-global/honduras>

⁴⁶ The gender gap in the Honduran labor market grows. (PRENSA LATINA) 2019. <https://www.prensa-latina.cu/index.php/component/content/?o=rn&id=307034&SEO=crece-la-brecha-de-genero-en-el-mercado-laboral-de-honduras>

⁴⁷ Honduras' national currency

⁴⁸ Survey carried out by the Central Bank, 2019.



from the United States indicates that the average age of emigrants ranges between 18 and 29 years old. In addition, 54% come from rural areas, 54% have children, 32% are single mothers, 46% have basic education and 55% did not have a house of their own, nor access to drinking water, or to the sanitation services in Honduras⁴⁹. These indices reflect their socioeconomic difficulties.

It should be noted that, in Honduras, there are no programs to prevent female migration, and actions that do not differentiate socioeconomic particularities between both sexes prevail. INAM⁵⁰ and the *Ciudad Mujer Program*⁵¹ do not have a comprehensive vision to care for migrants, nor have they been able to consolidate a gender approach within public policies. In the country, fem-

inist organizations and some civil organizations are practically the only ones to drive the demands of migrants.

⁴⁹ Characterization of Honduran migrant women deported from the United States. UNAN-MANAGUA National Autonomous University of Nicaragua Lorenzo Ubaldo Pavón Rodríguez. 2017. <http://cies.edu.ni/cedoc/digitaliza/t977/t977.pdf>

⁵⁰ National Institute for Women

⁵¹ It is a program promoted from the Presidential House.

DEMANDS TO RESPOND TO THE PROBLEM

It is clear that emigration worsens, as its causes are not duly addressed. Public policies are the only ones capable of reducing the factors that drive people to emigrate. Therefore, the main responsible for the migration flow increase is the State of Honduras.


Therefore, it is necessary to redefine the State's role to address this social and human problem that affects millions of Hondurans. It is unjustifiable that government actions are practically limited to promoting remittances to sustain the macro economy and repatriating deceased migrants.

In the last four decades, the State has not incorporated explicit objectives for migration and development. Therefore, it is important that governments incorporate strategies aimed at preventing and reducing this phenomenon. As a starting point, the State must consider migration as a humanitarian problem and not as a solution to its economic crisis.

It is necessary for the State to admit that behind remittances there are citizens who put their lives at risk to search abroad for what they have not found in Honduras. In other words, it must recognize that mass migration is a consequence of non-compliance in assuring citizen welfare.

With that in mind, the main actions to improve the living conditions of migrants and the population at risk of migrating must come from the Honduran State. No other effort, regardless of the importance of their contributions, should replace the responsibilities of governments to respond to this problem.

Therefore, the construction of a new policy framework with objectives and goals to reduce emigration is required. The abandoned National Planning System needs to be reactivated, and the National Plan (2010-2022) and the Country Vision (2010-2038) must be strengthened, ensuring a comprehensive vision of emigration.



The problems women and children face must generate differentiated policies with national coverage. These actions should redefine a legal framework that protects them from violence and gender inequality, both in Honduras and in transit and destination countries, ensuring conditions of well-being to reduce their migration.

Honduran immigrants must rank as first-rate stakeholders in the promotion of development. The Honduran State must create alliances with recipient countries, in terms of job creation and human rights. Likewise, the development potential of the returned population must be considered, offering them real opportunities to reintegrate into society.

It is necessary for international cooperation to rethink its actions, since it has been relatively absent from the problem, with the exception of the International Organization for Migrations (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees, who by mandate support migration-related government and civil society initiatives.

As a conclusion, migration in the last forty years should guide a review of the neoliberal model and the political system in Honduras. The promise of the «economic spill»; has been nothing more than the precariousness in the living conditions of a population, which does not *leave*, but *flees* to seek better horizons.



In 1980, there were 39,000 Honduran immigrants in the United States, and by 2019, this figure had risen to 1.2 million. In other words, in almost 49 years this population grew 3,000%. In Spain, between 2016 and 2019, the Honduran community practically doubled, going from 50,000 to 96,000 immigrants.

Migration has become a flow of thousands of people coming into and going out of Honduras. It is estimated that every day around 300 people migrate, while 256 are deported. Currently, one out of every nine Honduran lives abroad, and more than 40% of the populations is thinking about or wishes to migrate.

To respond to the increase of migration in the last forty years, the following questions are raised as a starting point: What happened in Honduras during these four decades? Why are these massive displacements taking place? How does this affect women? How has the State responded to face this phenomenon? What does it intend to do?

«Culture of Exile: Causes and Consequences of Honduran Migration (1980-2020)» by interprets the evolution of the demographic movements in this Central American country, with a special emphasis on women who migrate, and draws a focus on civil society's demands.